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1. Vladimir Voronin reelected as the President of the Republic of Moldova  
 
Unexpected opposition move overshadowed the re-election on April 4, 2005 of 
Vladimir Voronin as a President. Configuration of the newly-elected Parliament, 
where Party of Communist's (PC) won 56 mandates, Moldova Democrata Bloc 
(MDB) 34 and Christian Democratic Popular Party (CDPP) 11 left a wide berth for 
political maneuvers as regards the election of the President by the MPs.  
 
Given that Communists were short of five mandates in order to elect the President (61 
needed), several scenarios were possible: a) opposition to boycott the presidential 
elections so as to trigger early parliamentary elections; b) Communists to secure the 
support of a part of opposition to endorse their candidate for the Presidency; c) wide 
consensus to be reached with opposition on a compromise candidate for the 
Presidency.  
 
In the parliamentary election aftermath, each of the scenarios had different chances, 
albeit comparable. The situation overturned when the Moldova Democrata Bloc 
(MDB) had split: Moldova Noastra Alliance (MNA) - 23 deputies, Democratic Party 
(DP) - 8, and Social-Liberal Party (SLP) - 3. It was obvious right from the beginning 
that Democratic Party's decision to leave the MDB would produce the "domino 
effect". However, nobody could have predicted that it would reverberate over the 
election of the President, and this because none of the opposition groups designated 
their candidate for the presidency. Therefore, Communists designated two of them so 
as to comply with the Constitutional Court's requirements (Article 78 of the 
Constitution providing "at least two candidates should run for the position of the 
President of the Republic of Moldova").  
 
The big intrigue of the day was that 56 Communists, 8 deputies of the Democratic 
Party, 11 Christian-Democrats and 3 Social-Liberals took part in the voting 
procedure. Eighteen deputies of the MNA faction did not take part in elections, while 
five deputies of the same faction were absent. Out of the 78 deputies who took part in 
elections, 75 cast their ballots in favor of Vladimir Voronin, one for his counter 
candidate Gheorghe Duca, while two ballots were declared invalid. Curiously enough, 
four years ago, 71 out of 89 deputies voted for Vladimir Voronin. During this 
campaign Party of Communists got 15 less mandates, while the President four more.  
 
 
2. Foreign factor  
 
One may well say that a political compromise was reached as a result of the 
negotiations held between Communist leader with the leaders of Christian-
Democratic Peoples' Party, Democratic Party and Social-Liberal Party. Analyst 
Vladimir Socor claimed in the Jamestown's Eurasia Daily Monitor that "former U.S. 
Congressman John Conlan (R-AZ) was the indispensable facilitator in negotiations 
 1
 and document drafting among the political leaders and factions in Chisinau over a 
two-week period". Intermediary variant was made possible due to "foreign factor", 
which certainly was present but is hard to estimate.  
 
Therefore, to a large extend the same thing happened in Moldova as in Ukraine, when 
the heavy interference of the Russian Federation in the electoral race of 2004 
triggered the same reaction from the west. In the case of Moldova, the three 
resolutions passed by the State Duma threatening with economic sanctions on the 
grounds it did not approve of RM's policies towards Transdniestria triggered reactions 
from important western circles. This time, foreign factor consisted in the mediation of 
a political consensus between President Voronin and a part of opposition. Christian-
Democrat leader Iurie Rosca confirmed that when explaining his support to Vladimir 
Voronin "we have consulted our foreign partners. I have personally discussed with my 
friends in Bucharest, Tbilisi, Kiev, Washington and Brussels. I weighted the short 
time Moldova has to implement Action Plan Moldova - EU. When I have to take a 
tough political decision I do the following. I carefully consider what my enemy wants 
to achieve and do the opposite. In the last month I have noted several times that 
political foes of Moldova want to thwart Voronin's re-election. Simple logical 
reasoning, personal responsibility and state interests have led me to the conclusion to 
endorse Voronin".  
 
On the other hand, it is not exactly right to talk of a wide consensus, given that 
Moldova Noastra Alliance boycotted presidential elections.  
 
 
3. Terms of negotiations between President Voronin and opposition  
 
In his speech to the Parliament prior to elections, President Voronin acknowledged 
that in the last four years he committed a series of mistakes brought by high 
expectations. In the next four years, President pledged to "fulfil national interests 
based on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity". In this respect, he 
intended to achieve the following during his next mandate: a) implement EU - 
Moldova Action plan signed on February 22, 2005; b) improve socio-economic 
situation in line with the Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth Strategy (PREGS) 
voted on 2.12.2004; c) democratization of society in line with the first Copenhagen 
criteria (the main area of disagreement with opposition, where consensus was 
needed); d) settle Transdniestrian conflict with the support of US, EU, Romania, 
Ukraine and "fully exploiting the potential between Moldovan - Russian bilateral 
ties", etc.  
 
President Voronin's offer to a large extend reiterates the provisions of the 
"Declaration of political partnership in view of achieving EU accession objective", 
unanimously voted by all the deputies during their first session on March 24, 2005. It 
is all-too-clear that the latter was aimed at testing the compatibility and political 
aspirations of all parliamentary factions. Unanimous vote showed that there were no 
strategic disagreements, but rather dissatisfaction with the main candidate to the 
Presidential seat, especially given his past track record. An illustration of this point is 
the fact that Moldova Noastra boycotted elections.  
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Christian-Democrat leader Iurie Rosca also stated after elections "our greatest 
controversial argument between Power and Opposition that kept us on different 
positions was the domestic policy of the governors. Our different visions on the 
functioning of democratic institutions, on the way human rights and freedoms should 
be ensured". To overcome those disagreements Christian-Democrats and Social-
Liberals had submitted to Voronin a number or propositions, which Voronin pledged 
to fulfil in four months provided he would get elected. Generally, propositions 
accepted by Voronin refer to: a) ensuring media's independence (passing a new Law 
on Public Broadcaster, creating democratically a new Audiovisual Council, passing a 
new law on national TV and radio channels that would operate without censorship or 
political interference); b) ensuring independence of the judiciary by passing a new law 
on prosecution, amending the Law on Supreme Magistrate Council, Law on the Status 
of the Judge, Law on Judiciary; c) decentralizing local government, increasing the 
efficiency of public money spending by adopting a new Law on Accounts Chamber; 
d) amending Electoral Code to revise the establishment and membership of the 
Central Electoral Commission so as to depoliticize it and ensure its independence; e) 
perfecting laws on secret service that would ensure national security, human rights 
and freedoms and establish society's control over them by means of Parliament; f) 
creating a special commission to amend the Constitution in view of consolidation of 
state institutions by perfecting the procedures of election of the President, 
establishment of the Government, judiciary, elections of the Prosecutor General and 
the status of Prosecutor-General's Office.  
 
Several days earlier Democratic Party set forth similar conditions, in addition asking 
for: a) passing amendments to the Constitution providing that Presidential position is 
incompatible with party membership; b) modernizing Party of Communists; c) giving 
up Orthodox-Marxist dogmas and revising party's goals in line with European norms 
and principles.  
 
 
4. Are there any guarantees that re-elected President would keep his promises?  
 
Apparently Vladimir Voronin was re-elected as a result of a consensus reached with 
opposition, still one question remains unanswered: what are the guarantees that 
President would stick to the promise made? At the first glance, there are no explicit 
ones. In the end of his speech to the Parliament Voronin just said "I consider each 
word uttered by me today as an imperative as a pledge". In the same discourse 
Voronin underlined "I am ready to discuss … modifications to the legal framework so 
that the Presidential position would be incompatible with party membership". 
Immediately after elections, in an interview offered to mass-media he specified that 
the issue of compatibility will not be resolved very soon, once modernization of the 
Party of Communists is completed.  
 
Opposition leaders haven't put too many hopes that Vladimir Voronin would rapidly 
fulfill all the negotiated conditions. Christian-Democrat leader stated that the political 
decision to support Voronin was "a tough one, it is very risky, but most importantly it 
is responsible". Social-Liberal leader quoted by Democratia newspaper said, "we only 
have the word of honor of an officer as a guarantee. We hope that military code hasn't 
disappeared yet in this world".  
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Still there are some guarantees that President Voronin would keep his promises made 
to opposition. For this to happen, President and his governing should observe RM 
laws and international agreements RM signed. Thus PREGS for 2004-2006 provides 
that "European integration is a key objective for the country development, thereby 
imposing consistent implementation of democratic norms, economic development 
model and European living standards". It is the only law of the RM that clearly 
outlines the European integration objective. Furthermore on February 22, 2005 Action 
Plan Moldova - EU was signed in Brussels providing to a large extent the same 
conditions set forth by opposition.  
 
Indeed, it may happen that the governors would breach the aforesaid laws and 
international agreements, however in that case other guarantees that Voronin might 
have given to opposition might as well be breached.  
 
 
5. What's next?  
 
a) Tasks of the ruling party are more than clear. In the very first half of their 
mandate the new Government team to be appointed by Communists and their leader 
President Voronin would have to implement PREGS and Action Plan EU - Moldova. 
Those are rather complex tasks that might be jeopardized if Russia really delivers the 
threats it made.  
 
Firstly, statement made by Aleksandr Reazanov, Deputy Chair of Gazprom that the 
prices on gas might go up for Moldova, thus reaching European level, coupled with 
plans by Transdniestrian authorities to set its own enterprise that would import gas 
thus breaking apart from "Moldova-gaz" - are clear signals of Russia's plans to set 
differentiated tariffs for the gas supplied to Chisinau and that supplied to Tiraspol. 
Consequently, energy challenges would only amplify the economic ones.  
 
Secondly, GUUAM Summit scheduled for April 22 in Chisinau might infer new 
dimensions to Moldovan foreign policy and ways of settling Transndniestrian 
conflict. So far, it is still unclear what solution to Transdniestrian conflict would 
President Yushenko present. Ukraine's position is of crucial importance in resolving 
the conflict, especially if coordinated with EU and US. Russian side already stated it 
did not want any changes to the negotiations format, while "secessionist international" 
(Transdniestria, Abkhazia, and South Osetia) supported by Russia threatened to 
establish a military union. It comes as no surprise then that the provocations from 
Transdniestrian side are quite often lately.  
 
Thirdly, it's hard to predict how would the modernization of the Party of Communists 
go. So far, President Voronin managed to steer away from any conflicts with the party. 
For the first time the intention to modernize the party was announced at the 
Communist Plenary of May 2002, however that wasn't achieved even at the fifth 
Congress held in December 2004 and was postponed till after elections. Having said 
that, it would be quite interesting to know whether President Voronin consulted his 
faction prior to negotiating with opposition? It would be also interesting to know what 
were the reactions of the faction members? The mere fact that Christian-Democrats 
and Social-Liberals kept secret their intention to take part in elections may lead us to 
suspect that Voronin didn't consult his faction either. This might be the case if  
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considering that is still uncertain whether the three votes cast against Voronin came 
from the Communists. If so, that might be the most dangerous indicator of a possible 
scission. Too dramatic were the changes Party of Communists has gone through. At 
the fourth Congress of the Party of Communists, on April 22, 2001, its delegates were 
ready to turn Moldova into "Cuba of the Europe", thereby setting an example how to 
revive Communism in the post-soviet countries, which were to form a new federation 
(a new USSR). Four years later on April 22, 2005 Chisinau would host GUUAM 
Summit, while three of its members openly committed to join the efforts in view of 
accession to EU. In fact, those dramatic changes came in response to the challenges 
posted by NATO and EU enlargement, but more so Russia's open support to 
Transdniestria separatist regime.  
 
Under those circumstances, dramatic changes lie ahead of the ruling party during its 
next mandate.  
 
 
b) Power - Opposition  
 
After presidential elections the ruling party would have to confront "several 
oppositions". Leaders of Christian-Democrats, Democratic Party, Social-Liberals that 
supported Voronin's re-election publicly stated they would stay in opposition. Iurie 
Rosca, leader of Christian-Democrats commented on future relations: "From now on 
the days of hostility and mistrust between President Voronin and Christian-Democrats 
are long gone. We decided to establish a constructive dialogue, partnership, 
cooperation and complementary relations between the power and opposition. In the 
name of the national interests of the country, in the name of social peace, in the name 
of the European future of this country". That does not mean that the relationships 
between power and so-called "constructive opposition" uniting 22 deputies would 
be smooth. It would be "constructive opposition's" role to develop draft laws, on 
which it insisted, thereby testing the reactions of the governors' and overseeing the 
enforcement of PREGS and Action Plan Moldova - EU. A pragmatic relation seeking 
attainment of the same goals but from different positions would be of mutual benefit 
to power and opposition. The former could count on non-aggressiveness and 
cooperation of the latter upon crisis, especially those instigated from abroad. The 
latter would have only to gain if Party of Communists achieves the strategic goals that 
coincide with opposition's ones, and if on top of that Party of Communists modernizes 
and becomes an European party. Too nice to be true...  
 
Moldova Noastra has already been labeled "obstructive opposition" for its failure to 
take part in the presidential elections. There are no strategic reasons that would 
explain the different actions taken by Moldova Noastra and its former MDB's partners 
Democratic Party and Social-Liberal Party. Certainly, we may admit that Moldova 
Noastra deputies are more principled that their former colleagues. Still, a more 
plausible explanation is the personal conflict between PC leader Vladimir Voronin 
and MNA leader Serafim Urechean. Evidence to this is the fact that back in 2001 
Serafim Urechean saluted Communists' victory in elections and declared his readiness 
to cooperate with the new ruling. One year later, state run media launched a 
denigration campaign against Urechean accusing him of corruption, albeit it had never 
been proven in court. That made Urechean Voronin's top political foe, especially after 
the former defeated a Communist candidate in the 2003 mayoral race.  
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Apparently, for now Communists and Moldova Noastra are not on good terms. 
During a press conference after presidential elections MNA leader stated it would 
become "an active and not constructive" opposition that would be "critical of all the 
ruling coalitions' mistakes and would draw the attention of international community 
to its violations". In a recent interview to "Olvia-press" (Transdnestrian press agency) 
Urechean indicated that he did not exclude "repressions to start any day soon". MNA 
leaders did point the actions they might undertake, initiating referenda on direct 
election of the president and changing electoral system. Opinion polls show that 70-
80% of Moldova citizens favor direct elections of the President as well as election of 
deputies in uninominal districts. Probably, MNA leaders intend to test Communists 
readiness to keep their promises to democratize society.  
 
Most likely, Communists would face confrontations from the extra-parliamentary 
opposition. Out of the latter only three pro-Russian ones ("Patria-Rodina" Bloc, Labor 
Union, and Ravnopravie) would continue to gobble up into Communists electorate 
sharing leftist and pro-Russian visions.  
 
 
c) Relations opposition - opposition  
 
The triumph of the President Voronin, re-elected with the help of the "constructive 
opposition" has yet another dimension to it. In the near future the so-called 
"constructive" and "obstructive" oppositions would want to clear things out.  
 
As it was to be expected the democratic media affiliated to "the two oppositions 
already started a debate to justify the "constructive opposition" on the one hand, and 
accusations of "betrayal" on the other. MNA is striving to promote the idea that 
Communists together with the "constructive opposition" represent a governing 
coalition. The latter refute, claiming the only thing they did was preventing a crisis 
and that they remained in opposition. In fact, one may not even talk of an alliance 
between the components of the "constructive opposition", they are so different that 
even the risk they assumed when supporting the re-election of Vladimir Voronin are 
different.  
 
Democratic party having a 8% rating didn't risk too much endorsing Voronin as in the 
last three years it undertook numerous steps to convert Communists to social-
democracy by organizing different fora, joint participation in a left and center-left 
political alliance, or ad-hoc alliances at the local level. The three Social-Liberal 
deputies bear a risk proportional to the political weight of the party, whose rating does 
not exceed 3%. Christian-Democrats bear the highest risks as their image of 
consistent "anti-communist" fighter is at stake. That is why, Iurie Rosca was saying 
that "From now on the days of hostility and mistrust between President Voronin and 
Christian Democratic Popular Party are long gone", not between PC and CDPP. 
However, one should not exaggerate the risks Christian-Democrats are taking, they 
made other "unexpected" moves in the past when they entered in coalitions with 
forces they considered to be their political enemies, or voted key issues with them: 
endorsing president Mircea Snegur in 1996 presidential elections, forming Alliance 
for Democracy and Reforms ruling coalition together with Democratic Party in 1998, 
voting for ousting the so-called democratic "Sturza Government" together with 
Communists and voting in "Braghis Government" in 1999. Nevertheless their rating  
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grew slowly but steadily. It seems it was the label "opposition forever" or "the party 
of 9%" that determined Christian-Democrats to take actions and get rid of "nationalist 
and extremist party" image perpetrated by governmental mass-media. As for the 
recent decision to endorse Voronin, if Christian-Democrats were wrong, they were 
wrong in one thing believing in his honesty, given that Voronin and Party of 
Communists stole Christian Democrats best tunes and not vice versa.  
 
MNA might know a spectacular evolution, however this depends on whether its 
leader, Serafim Urechean, would decide to stay as Mayor of Chisinau or move to 
Parliament. If he goes for the mayoralty this means he is ready to continue 
confronting Party of Communists and probably "constructive opposition", while the 
big fight would be fought in two yeas during elections of the mayor.  
 
However, for the MNA to survive and develop, its leader would need a facelift to get 
rid of the image created under the constant pressing of the governors. In the recent 
election campaign, Urechean had a more hesitating than a decisive message. On the 
one hand it was in the framework of European accession. On the other hand, his 
desire to portray himself as moderated politician, able to restore good ties with 
Russian and Ukraine, resume negotiations with Transdniestrian leaders was obvious. 
Of course, there is nothing wrong in it, except that he made several mistakes: a) 
stammering congratulations of Yanukovici after Ukrainian elections; b) interviews in 
Russian media featuring contradictory statements, and later refutations; c) accusation 
of bias brought to OSCE Observation Mission and arguments that the West supported 
Voronin and its Communist because of their anti-Russian rhetoric. This exactly 
coincided with statements made by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc. 
Governmental media cited the latter as evidence to the fact that Urechean was 
supported by Russian and Ukrainian circles interested in the survival of the 
Transdniestrian regime. Other evidences cited include: a) Russian authorities' 
provided support in hosting the Congress of "Patria Moldova" in Moscow that called 
people to vote for MDB; b) calls by Transdniestrian authorities for Moldovan citizens 
to vote for MDB.  
 
As a MDB leader, Urechean couldn't provide his colleagues with a clear scenario in 
case they failed to become a ruling coalition: a) announcement of participation in 
protest rallies after parliamentary elections (expected Moldovan version of orange 
revolution) was made only because he new Christian-Democrats were organizing 
them, pointing to their interest in protest rallies rather than capacity to stage them; b) 
media reported that after elections MDB members were kept together only by means 
of threats; c) one month after elections MDB leader failed to provide a clear answer 
whether he would stay in mayoralty or move to Parliament; d) MDB failed to 
designate its own candidate for the presidency, nor was it able to clearly explain why 
they had boycotted elections.  
 
The most eloquent illustration of MDB's inconsistency were the so-called "22 
principle conditions" set forth by MDB for electing the President of the RM. To a 
large extend those conditions are to be found in those of the Democratic Party, 
Christian-Democratic Party and Social-Liberal Party, in addition they include: a) 
denouncing the Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation 
of 1992 on the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict; b) immediately adopting a 
law that would outlaw Russian military presence on the soil of the Republic of  
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Moldova in Transdnestria; c) replacing Russian peacemaking troops with 
international UN, EU, or NATO forces; d) denouncing the Agreement on Founding 
Commonwealth of Independent States; e) amending Article 13 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Moldova so as to change the name of the state language into 
"Romanian" etc.  
 
Being asked whether he himself subscribes to those conditions, MNA leader replied 
those were not conditions but rather questions to the chief of state. Several days later 
in an interview to the Transdnestrian "Olvia-press" agency Urechean stated: "the so 
called "22 conditions" were unjustly attributed to us. We have never came up with 
such a thing". Later again he claimed those were released by his press service without 
him being informed.  
 
The case of "22 conditions" is relevant in the context of lost opportunities. If MN 
leader had done a simply thing - inviting candidates running for the presidency and 
other opposition factions to TV debates on Moldova 1 channel, then he would have 
been an absolute winner, at least morally. And that because: a) President Voronin 
could not refuse, otherwise MNA would have had an excuse for not taking part in 
elections, i.e. President declined to have an open dialogue with citizens; b) MNA 
would have had an excellent opportunity to remind the President Voronin that he had 
avoided TV debates in a quite arrogant manner during the parliamentary election 
campaign; c) it would have been an occasion to present Voronin the "22 conditions-
questions" within the discussion of his presidential platform; d) it would have been 
the most eloquent proof of media freedom, which would have left "constructive 
opposition" speechless.  
 
As it didn't do that, MN and its leader left the impression they wanted to defy 
President Voronin, as they knew far-too-well those "22 conditions" would be 
unacceptable to him. This behavior does not justify boycotting elections, showing the 
obstructionism of the said move.  
 
In fact, Urechean's actions were quite predictable long time ago. Even before the 
establishment of MDB in early 2004 he published a programming article in 
"Moldavskie vedomosti" newspaper (no. 619) entitled "Moldova should have a 
dream". He was wondering whether "authorities don't understand that friendship with 
Russia is not a result of political or economic conjuncture, but rather a historic choice 
of Moldova?". According to him, the strategic goal "alfa and omega of our evolution 
is Moldova accession to EU". For "Moldova's dream" to come true authorities should 
not titter from West to East, but rather go for the middle way of good relations both 
with West and East. That would have enabled Moldova to become "Switzerland of the 
Balkans" by capitalizing on the advantages of its geographic positioning. The "golden 
middle way" represents for Urechean "Republic of Moldova's organic integration in 
the free trade zone of the Southeastern Europe" as well as "in single economic zone of 
CIS" established by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.  
 
So, one can say that the clash between "strategic goal" and "historic choice", coupled 
with the personal conflict between Serafim Urechean and President Voronin, pushed 
Moldova Democrata to split, resulting in "constructive" and "obstructive" opposition. 
The stake is quiet high, while the results of the clash depend on President Voronin's 
behavior. If he honors his promises, then "constructive" opposition wins enabling it to  
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grab Moldova Noastra's electorate (roughly estimated at 20%). Conversely, if Voronin 
doesn't honor his promises a part of "constructive" opposition would slip into a mere 
"collaborationist opposition", while the other would tacitly and humiliated join the 
"obstructionist" camp, with all the arising consequences.  
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The GUUAM summit 
Igor Botan, April 19, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 49, April 4-17, 2005 
 
 
1. The interest of Moldovan authorities for GUUAM 
 
Chisinau will host the GUUAM summit on April 22. The interest for this regional 
structure has reappeared in Moldova with a couple of weeks before the March 6 
parliamentary elections. Indeed, the authorities had pleaded for upgrading of the 
GUUAM about half a year ago. The attitude towards GUUAM was more than reticent 
until then. Vladimir Voronin said after being elected as chief of state in 2001 that 
Moldova would withdraw from GUUAM because this organisation follows anti-
Russian goals.  
 
There were many reasons after all, with all of them being related to the support of the 
Russian Federation for the Transdnestrian separatist regime, and they made the 
Moldovan authorities reconsider their attitude towards GUUAM in the past half a 
year, and two of these motives were decisive: a) the refusal of the Russian Federation 
to back the initiative on the Stability and Security Pact for Moldova (SSPM) released 
by President Voronin on June 1, 2004; b) repeated threats of the Russian State Duma 
to introduce economic sanctions against Moldova for its attitude towards the 
Transdnestrian separatist regime, with the threats aiming to obstruct the reelection of 
Vladimir Voronin as chief of state.  
 
The evolution of attitude of Moldovan authorities towards GUUAM is interesting 
from these reasons. At the very beginning, President Voronin believed that 
implementation of the SSPM would ensure a "multilateral compromise" between 
Russia, the United States, Romania, Ukraine, and the European Union (EU) "on a 
number of principle problems of Moldovan statehood…representing the guarantee of 
a long-term stability in this region." The compromise was clearly envisaging the 
Transdnestria settlement. Voronin mentioned then that if the sides fail to reach a 
mutual agreement, this "failure would have evident impacts on stability and security 
in region." The SSPM was the first resonance initiative released by the chief of state, 
aimed to search new solutions to the Transdnestrian conflict, after the confusion 
related to refusal to sign the "Kozak Memorandum" in November 2003. Launching 
the SSPM, the Moldovan authorities wanted to avoid any actions which could 
provoke negative reactions from Russia. Perhaps this is the explanation why President 
Voronin had turned down the invitation of newly-elected Georgian President Mikhail 
Saakashvili to attend the GUUAM summit in Batumi after Abashidze's run to 
Moscow.  
 
As it was mentioned already the attitude towards GUUAM was changed after Russia 
had categorically turned down the SSPM. Russia's ostentatious support for the 
Transdnestrian separatist regime after failure of the "Kozak Memorandum", as well as 
the refusal to withdraw its military and ammunition from the eastern region of 
Moldova, required new approaches of problems related to settlement of the 
Transdnestrian conflict. As it seems, it was reached a conclusion that the approach of  
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this issue, including through a regional organisation to which Russia is not member 
with its typical interests in Transdnestria, would be a solution in this regard. GUUAM 
is the only structure of this kind.  
 
It is interesting to highlight that the public authorities did not adopt any important 
documents on GUUAM till Russia's refusal to back the SSPM, though Moldova is 
part of this organisation since 1997. Instead, the situation has significantly changed 
after the Russian authorities turned down the SSPM, especially after the December 6-
7, 2004 OSCE summit in Sofia, which discussed this initiative. The government order 
on creation of a task force to draft and implement the national plan on implementation 
of the project on facilitation of trade and transportation within GUUAM was 
published on December 10, 2004, and the plan was worked out and unveiled on 
February 25, 2005. Also, the government included the 17,300-dollar GUUAM 
membership fee for 2005 in the decision on payment of membership fees and debts of 
Moldova towards international and regional organisations from the 2005 state budget, 
published on January 28, 2005.  
 
As it was said, this change of attitude towards GUUAM had one more justification. 
The lawmakers of the Russian State Duma, who initiated the adoption of three 
resolutions by the Russian State Duma last February, recommending the executive to 
apply economic sanctions against Moldova, publicly admitted that they wanted to 
obstruct Party of Moldovan Communists (PCRM) from winning the March 6 
parliamentary elections and to halt the reelection of Vladimir Voronin as Moldova's 
chief of state. This sort of ostentatious actions of the State Duma made President 
Voronin behave the necessary way. His initiative to pay a flash visit to Kiev on March 
1 in order to discuss a number of problems including the upgrading of GUUAM with 
President Viktor Yushchenko, as well as the immediately accepted invitation to 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to visit Moldova on March 2, made the 
impression of some coordinated actions including with influent foreign political 
centres.  
 
Undoubtedly, this initiative means that the Moldovan authorities decided to join the 
Carpathian Declaration on European development of Ukraine and Georgia, signed by 
Presidents Yushchenko and Saakashvili in early January 2005. President Voronin and 
his counterparts Yushchenko and, respectively, Saakashvili discussed on March 1 and 
2 almost the same set of issues related to: a) regional security and combat of 
separatism; b) diversification of energy providing sources; c) upgrading of GUUAM 
for a joint settlement of regional problems; d) coordination of efforts for European 
integration. It was decided to convoke the GUUAM summit in Chisinau on April 22 
for a better approach of these problems.  
 
 
2. Development perspectives of GUUAM 
 
Expectations related to the GUUAM summit generated both optimism, and much 
scepticism. Indeed, a first positive effect of convocation of the GUUAM summit in 
Chisinau was already observed in the internal policy of Moldova. One part of 
opposition gave up intention to block up the election of Moldovan president, with the 
need to set up the new central power bodies after elections and before the GUUAM 
summit being one of reasons invoked in this regard. As a result, the parliament  
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ratified on April 15 the following documents under emergency regime: a) Yalta Chart 
of GUUAM, the basic juridical document on constitution of organisation; b) GUUAM 
agreement on creation of free trade zone; c) agreement on creation of the GUUAM 
Information Office. However, the development perspectives of GUUAM after 
upgrading leave room for many questions related to:  
 
a) interests and cohesion level of GUUAM-member states. At the very beginning, 
the tasks of the GUUAM-member states aimed to join efforts in order to ensure the 
conditions needed for an economic growth based on: development and 
implementation of joint projects on economics, trade, transportation, communications, 
financial cooperation; border, customs, scientific, etc. cooperation. Later, as the 
GUUAM members faced defiance, the tasks were reformulated: peaceful settlement 
of regional conflicts on basis of principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
inviolability of borders; combat of aggressive separatism and international terrorism; 
coordination of cooperation of member states with international institutions (United 
Nations, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Council of Europe, 
Consultative Group of member states of Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, etc.)  
 
However, a series of political and economic factors had jeopardized the development 
of GUUAM in the past years. The political factors comprise first of all the conflicts in 
member countries, for example between Moldova and Ukraine regarding the attitude 
towards the Transdnestrian separatism regime. Secondly, the West's attitude over the 
former Ukrainian administration of president Kuchma made the latter seriously 
consider the possibility to mainly focus on Russia-promoted projects - the Euro-
Asiatic Economic Union, Joint Economic Space, etc.  
 
As for economic factors, Russia had efficiently used the opportunities to defend its 
economic interests and to demonstrate the economic flabbiness of GUUAM. The 
decision to start the construction of the petrol pipe Baku-Tbilisi-Cheyhan had 
significantly reduced the interest of Azerbaijan and Georgia for transit of petrol 
through territories of other GUUAM states, as the Azerbaijani oil reserves were 
insufficient for building of other pipes. Once Russia had joined the Baku-Tbilisi-
Cheyhan project, it found other energy compromise solutions with Azerbaijan, 
making this country more reticent over projects of GUUAM. The Russian authorities 
and oil business had successfully persuaded the former Kiev administration to use the 
Odessa-Brody pipe under reverse regime, contrary to initial plans on exportation of 
Caspian petrol to Poland's borders and further enlargement of the pipe to Gdansk. As 
this pipe surrounded Moldova's territory, the latter regarded this gesture as elimination 
from GUUAM projects, showing a similar behaviour towards this organisation. Nor 
Uzbekistan was forgotten, as the Gazprom concern signed agreements on exploitation 
and transportation of gas with this country as well. In addition, estimations of Russian 
experts aim to demonstrate that China's increasing interest for energy resources could 
offer a better perspective to countries in the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia to 
export hydrocarbons to this country with an impressive economic potential. It also 
means that there are evident contradictions between the EU and USA regarding the 
exportation of energy resources of Iran to the West.  
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If we add that the volume of mutual trade represents only two percent of the total 
volume of external trade of GUUAM states, we can conclude that mainly political 
factors and less economic factors dictated the upgrading of GUUAM so far.  
 
The upgrading of GUUAM really follows the beginning of a new electoral cycle in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Russia's direct meddling in elections in 
Abkhazya, Ukraine and Moldova; support for separatism in Georgia and Moldova; 
incitement for separatism in Ukraine through participation of Russian officials in the 
December 10, 2004 Severodonetsk congress seem to decisively determine the 
upgrading of GUUAM. It seems that the GUUAM-member states had reached the 
conclusion that defiance provoked by foreign meddling can be stopped only through 
joint efforts within this regional organisation. For example, the individual efforts of 
Georgia and Moldova to eliminate the risks related to the separatist regimes supported 
by Russia are viewed and understood in one way in Brussels and Washington. For 
sure, the same efforts of a regional organisation such as GUUAM, after Ukraine had 
also entered the risk zone of separatism, will be regarded on a different way in these 
capitals.  
 
It can be said in this regard that an eventual success of the GUUAM summit in 
Chisinau could have a decisive impact on further developments. This success 
particularly depends on how Ukraine will be able to justify its ambitions of regional 
leader. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko mentioned in his speech at the 
Warsaw University on April 12 that he intends to unveil a new concept on regional 
partnership and leadership at the Chisinau summit. It seems that this concept 
envisages his Transdnestria settlement initiative. It is known so far that this initiative 
is based on principles of "respect for Moldova's territorial integrity and insurance of a 
sufficient autonomy to Transnistria, and this would stabilise the political situation in 
the entire region." According to Yushchenko, settlement of conflicts near Ukraine's 
borders is an emergency, since the Ukraine-Moldova frontier is a bridge for illegal 
migration and trafficking. The participation of the OSCE and USA in equipping the 
checkpoints in line with modern standards and norms, as well as joint efforts could 
ensure an efficient settlement. On the other hand, political leaders, experts from 
Moldova and other countries expressed concern over secret nature of the work on the 
"project", which has the signs of some internal conflicts between groups of the Kiev 
administration with different interests in the Transdnestrian region. This may provoke 
the failure of the "Ukrainian project" in Transdnestria and ambitions of this country to 
become a regional leader, with negative consequences for GUUAM. The Moldovan 
authorities had promised to turn down any projects seeking an eventual settlement of 
the Transdnestrian conflict through federalisation of Moldova.  
 
b) interest of the U.S and E.U. for GUUAM. There is no doubt that the ability of 
GUUAM to survive and develop is directly proportionate to the interest of the USA 
and EU in this region. Therefore, the GUUAM members should back this interest. 
This interest was initially based on possibility to develop the so-called 
"Transportation Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Caspian Sea", an eventual restoration of 
the "Silk Road", which opened the access to regions rich of hydrocarbons in Central 
Asia. There are tries to get rid of the previous incapacity (till elections in Georgia and 
Ukraine) of the GUUAM-member states to reach the declared goals and maintain the 
interest of the USA and EU for this regional organisation by giving new valences to 
this stricture. Invitation of representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, the  
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Baltics, etc. at the GUUAM summit in Chisinau opens perspectives for cooperation 
within GUUAM by attracting interests for much wider geopolitical projects such as 
the Black Sea Basin and Baltic Sea - Black Sea cooperation, areas which represent 
connections between the West and Central Asia. The USA and EU could show an 
increased interest for these perspectives. Although the economic interests of the USA 
and EU in region are related to a farther perspective, the interest for political stability 
and security should be very shaped, since illegal trafficking and migration in region 
represent a common threat;  
 
c) perception and interest of Russia to oppose the development of GUUAM. The 
Russian authorities and experts had a negative attitude towards GUUAM from the 
very beginning, regarding this regional organisation as a threat for its political, 
economic and security interests in the post-Soviet area. That's why Russia had 
undertaken different successful measures in order to demonstrate the economic 
weakness of GUUAM. The recent meddling in elections in Ukraine and Moldova 
demonstrated that Russia wanted a lot to maintain the political control in region 
through very typical methods. However, the eventual creation of a collective security 
system in the GUUAM area had raised the deepest concern. The fact that Ukraine and 
Moldova had never joined the CIS Collective Security Agreement, while Georgia, 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew from this security structure fueled these 
suspicions. In particular, Russian experts are concerned over declared intentions of 
Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members in perspective. Although nobody 
nourishes illusions regarding the preparation and eventual terms of entry of these 
countries in NATO, the possibility of an intermediary cooperation between an 
eventual collective security system GUUAM and Euro-Atlantic structures is not 
excluded. Russia dislikes very much this sort of eventual cooperation. As it was said, 
GUUAM is the only regional structure in the CIS to which Russia is not a member, 
while the announced intention of GUUAM to cooperate for insurance of stability in 
the Black Sea Basin and the Black Sea-Baltic Sea region, areas where NATO and EU 
have recently enlarged, only fuels Russia's suspicions that the new NATO and EU 
members could become strong lawyers of interests of GUUAM states in relations with 
Washington and Brussels.  
 
Russia had already reacted. It backed the intention of the "separatist international" 
made up by Transnistria, Abkhazya and South Ossetya to create a military alliance to 
combat the eventual integrating effects inside GUUAM. Also, Russia is indirectly 
introducing "economic sanctions" (the recent case of Moldova) by prohibiting the 
importation of agricultural or food products from veterinary or sanitary security 
reasons. However, the precedent experience had demonstrated that support for 
separatism and introduction of "economic sanctions" can have contradictory effects 
and harm Russia's interests.  
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Upgrading of GUUAM. Tendencies and perspectives 
Iurie Gotisan, 25 April 2005  
 
 
The reason to create the GUUAM is as actual and motivated as possible The project 
on creation of an efficient union of states, regarded especially as an economic and, 
eventually, defence-military alliance, within the non-functional Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), was libelled as counterproductive since its creation in 1997, 
being permanently criticized and obstructed. Paradoxically, however, but these 
permanent attempts to undermine the strengthening of this group unveil indeed the 
special importance and efficiency of this alliance in case of a successful functioning.  
The very solid bases of this organisation guarantee the efficiency of such an 
association, extraordinary development potential of GUUAM.  
 
• from economic point of view, the creation of this union of states in the Euro-
Asian transportation corridor which rebuilds the old Silk Road and in the 
planned oil pipe Caspian Sea-West Europe via the Black Sea represents a 
reason to be well enough motivated, maybe the vault key of the planned 
spectacular development of region.  
 
• from strategic and military viewpoints, it is not an accident that at least five 
hot zones "blood" in the GUUAM territory: Transnistria in Moldova; conflicts 
related to Crimea and the Black Sea navy in Ukraine; South Ossetya and 
Abkhazya in Georgia; Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan; armed conflict in the 
Fergana region in Uzbekistan. To highlight that each country of this group 
which faces separatist tensions negotiates more or less directly with Russia 
problems related to secessionist tendencies of different approached entities, as 
well as the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces form the GUUAM 
states. Elaboration of a coherent and convergent policy on defence policy and 
settlement of conflicts will provide an increased efficiency against division of 
initiatives in this regard.  
 
However, many signals had fueled the fears regarding a normal development of this 
organisation. Delays, postponements, hesitations and oscillations regarding the fate 
and normal functioning of this organisation may be finally understood, if taking into 
account the difficulties faced by former Soviet states in all the sectors. Continuation 
of these uncertainties and late process of consolidation of organisation would forecast 
negative developments for the economic strategic future of region.  
 
 
GUUAM - a new CEFTA  
 
Development of organisation throughout commercial and energy transportation 
itineraries Europe-Caucasus-Asia will have very important consequences for countries 
in region. The existence of GUUAM as an interstate organisation will be an 
unquestionably important force in the context of placement at intersections of so 
many zones of interests, when it will be strengthened as a functional whole, with joint 
institutions, convergent foreign policy, well-coordinated defence strategy.  
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Thus, the organisation is developing on basis of a confluence area between Euro-
Atlantic space, Russia, the Arab states, and the Asian continent. A regional 
construction like CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement) or Vishegrad 
Group would clearly attract western-European investors and others who would be 
much more motivated to finance projects jointly implemented by the GUUAM states 
and would not take into account the different interests that could appear in case of 
division and disappearance of organisation.  
 
The East-European countries which created the Vishegrad Group demonstrated an 
extraordinary spirit of team, being heard as a much more stronger common voice in 
negotiations on entry in the European Union (E.U.) and NATO. Creation of CEFTA 
around the same group of East-European countries (regarded as an anteroom of E.U.) 
followed the same purpose: to create a free exchange zone aimed to ease the transition 
to economic integrity with the West and to reduce the effects of E.U. exigencies for 
candidate countries.  
 
Invitation of Moldova to join a number of European and Euro-Atlantic organisations  
(Partnership for Peace, Stability Pact in South-East Europe, Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation, World Trade Organisation, etc.), as well as encouragement of GUUAM 
to turn into a free exchange zone (it is known the readiness of the U.S. administration 
to finance projects on institutional consolidation of GUUAM) are also indicators in 
favour of the need of a regional cooperation, coordination of efforts of states sharing 
the same interests for integration and elimination of economic difficulties.  
 
If there are no other short-term opportunities to get rid of the economic impasse, 
development of planned transportation itineraries are the only way to energy 
independence and the very necessary economic development for the GUUAM states. 
This is an occasion that must be fructified at all costs.  
 
 
Russia. Fears of "elder brother"  
 
Russia's opposition, its fears over intentions of the five states are the key modulation 
point on sinusoid of existence of GUUAM. An union of post-Soviet states, created 
basically on economic criteria - outside of Russia must not be regarded as a defiance 
or even a threat of its interests. The wish of these states to plan an own future without 
participation of the "elder brother", the way it happened in the former Soviet Union, a 
situation typical to the CIS (that's why difficult), is normal and welcome. This 
happens when Russia, as main actor on the CIS scene, is incapable to provide material 
assistance to "satellites" first of all, since it faces very pressing internal problems.  
 
Also, Russia had encouraged the creation of the Euro-Asian Economic Community 
within the same quasi-inefficient CIS, signing of the Minsk agreements regarding the 
strengthening of the Collective Security Agreement, demonstrating one more time 
that the pro-Russian core within the CIS is strengthened when the interests demand 
this. Even more, upgrading of ASC after the model of the former Warsaw Treaty, 
with placement of armed forces of signatory states of the treaty under a single 
command, becomes very significant (these are three regional groups: western Russia-
Belarus, Caucasian Russia-Armenia, and Central-Asian Russia-Kazakhstan- 
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Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan, whose armed forces return under Russia's command in case of 
aggression).  
 
Also, it is worth to take into account that the CIS economies face a structural crisis on 
background of a social political instability, which can be hidden nor by the recent 
economic growth due to favourable exogenous factors. Although CIS adepts say that 
the former Soviet republics are interested in a single external economic vector, which 
would ease the access to extra-community markets, they do not follow the same geo-
economic priorities in reality.  
 
The case of Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is an example in this regard, as their 
interests run counter each other concerning the problem of Caspian hydrocarbons. 
Armenia's industry, which is entirely dependent on importation of energy resources 
and jeopardized by Azerbaijan's blockade, is another example is this regard. The 
economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is undermined 
by the latent conflict in the Fergana region. The main problem in Belarus is to keep 
the state-owned property in economy, while Kazakhstan, by contrary, sells the most 
of enterprises to foreign companies. This state of things and namely an evident lack of 
progresses was identified by many analysts and political observers who admitted that 
there is almost no evolution regarding the creation of the single economic space, 
because every member state works in line with own rigours.  
 
Perhaps CEEA was aimed to reduce the possible share of GUUAM, which Moscow 
regards as an anti-Russian arrangement dominated by Ukraine. An eventual adhesion 
of Ukraine to CEEA, which also holds a status of observer as Moldova does, would 
mean the death of GUUAM as regional economic structure uncontrolled by Moscow. 
Nor the fact that Russia wants to keep at least the control on exports on the eastern 
and northern sides of the Caspian Sea at all costs, after it lost the influence in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are interested in the southern thoroughfare Baku-
Tbilisi-Cheykhan.  
 
The Russia-Moldova relationship must be based on equal ties, so that to eliminate any 
traces of vassalage relations which existed in the former Soviet Union. Russia's 
attraction in GUUAM would be very dangerous because of the impending danger to 
block up the functioning of mechanisms of the group: the five smaller states would 
experience again the disproportion between members, and there would be a natural 
tendency to an evolution of organisation for interest of the strongest one, and this fact 
would provoke unwanted frustrations and adverse reactions. The Russian fears 
regarding the future of GUUAM are in contradiction with the real interests of the five 
states.  
 
 
Separatism - a common enemy  
 
The hottest tension points in the former Soviet area are in territories of the GUUAM-
member states. The Transnistrian separatism, Abkhazian-Ossetian separatism, the 
Crimea problem (along with the Black Sea navy issue), and the latest separatist 
"outbreaks" in the eastern region of Ukraine, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh are also obstacles on way of peace in region. They represent the  
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big provocation for Europe besides the Chechen problem and conflict in the former 
Yugoslavian area at the beginning of century.  
 
The Tiraspol mafia clique is the main threat for stability and economic development 
of Moldova, and even for its existence as state. Withdrawal of at least "moral" support 
of the troops on the left bank of the Dniester river for the Tiraspol separatist regime 
gets a special importance. Pressures on Tiraspol (the first effects became real through 
start of the process of release of political prisoners) must be corroborated with 
pressures aimed at withdrawal of Russian troops from region.  
 
The same fact is effective for Caucasus. Pullout of Russian troops from the so-called 
separatist "republics" would represent the beginning of normalization of situation in 
region. Coordination of efforts of diplomats of GUUAM states which face separatism-
related problems, adoption of a common defence strategy in spirit of the Partnership 
for Peace principles would enhance a lot the effects on participating decision making 
factors.  
 
The new Chisinau government carries decisions of a capital importance for future of 
the country. That's why Moldova, which had permanently affirmed its wish to 
strengthen the democratic and economic institutions in European spirit, must continue 
its way to Europe. Its guides on this way must follow one interest: to see the own 
people among large families of European democracies.  
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Ukrainian plan 
Igor Botan, May 27, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 51, May 2-22, 2005 
 
1. "Ukrainian" plan is also Moldovan  
 
The "Plan for resolving Transdnistrian conflict proposed by Ukraine" published on 
May 20, 2005 together with the comments that followed from Minister of 
Reintegration, Vasile Sova, shall generate many more debates in the future.  
 
A closer look at the Plan, the context in which it was made public, collateral events, 
domestic and international reactions to the document both critical and more 
"balanced" ones, gives the impression of a show with actors playing their parts. Those 
left aside have been taken by surprise and are the mere spectators of the show.  
 
The way "Ukrainian plan" was developed is reminiscent of Moldovan authorities 
approach after 2001 when it used to ask mediators to come up with propositions that 
would be acceptable to Republic of Moldova (RM). The benefit for the mediators was 
evident - reaping the laurels of regional leaders able to come up with solutions for the 
entire region.  
 
Up to late 2003 Russian Federation had been RM's strategic partner that is why 2002 
Kiev OSCE plan to a large extent reproduced federative model outlined in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. Diplomats hinted that Moldovan authorities 
requested the release of the document under OSCE auspices. It is known for a fact 
that when President Voronin decided to introduce the "asymmetric" elements into the 
federative plan, he asked his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to develop a new 
plan. After refusing to sign the "Kozak Memorandum" in November 2003, President 
Voronin publicly acknowledged that about 70% of the document had been written in 
Chisinau, while the rest 30% had been coordinated with Moscow and Tiraspol in view 
of reaching a comprise.  
 
The same holds true for the Ukrainian plan. It is very unlikely Ukraine to have 
developed a plan without being asked by Chisinau first. Undoubtedly, prior to being 
made public the Plan's provisions have been carefully coordinated between Chisinau 
and Kiev. By doing so, Chisinau attempts to end the stalemate and create a new 
framework for the resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict. The benefits for Ukraine 
are numerous, ambition to become a regional leader, but also the need to resolve a 
conflict at its borders.  
 
Moldovan authorities' stake on the "Ukrainian Plan" is understandable, given that 
Kiev holds real levers to influence the situation by means of its customs policy at its 
border with Transdniestria. Still, it is not less important how other strategic actors are 
dealt with. Under those circumstances Moscow's role morphed from a pro-active to a 
defensive one, of defending its own interests and the interests of secessionist regime it 
has been supporting. Having said that, Russia and Transdniestria have practically the 
same interests - to reject the Plan.  
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US and EU positions have been taken into account in as far as they are committed to 
protect their interests in the region. Rejection of the "Kozak Memorandum" in 
November 2003 has shown that their interests resume to political stability in the 
region and not allowing proliferation of Russian military presence in the region. As 
for the rest, it is less relevant for US or EU whether a federative model or any other 
would be chosen.  
 
 
2. The gist of "Ukrainian Plan"  
 
The "Ukrainian Plan" gives the impression that what the authors wanted is very 
difficult to achieve. On the one hand, the main provisions of the plan reiterate the 
recent statements made by Moldovan authorities, i.e. giving up on federative model 
and renewing negotiation format.  
 
On the other hand, the document clearly shows that its authors did not give up on 
previous engagements, ideas and even fears as regards Transdniestrian conflict, 
however these are worded differently in the "Ukrainian Plan". Indeed, this new 
approach seeks to avoid antagonizing Russian Federation even further, that already 
threatened to impose economic sanctions against Moldova.  
 
As it was mentioned, in choosing the partner to propose the plan to resolve 
Transdniestrian conflict, Chisinau in fact chose the method of resolving the conflict. 
That was the case of the plans developed by the Russian Federation envisaging 
federalist models of resolving the conflict, methods which Transdnestrian authorities 
tended to turn into confederalist ones (similar to agreement between Serbia and 
Montenegro). Those models implied amending the Constitution of the Republic of 
Moldova, with all the ensuing consequences.  
 
The same holds true for the Ukrainian Plan that greatly resembles the model applied 
in Crimean Autonomous Republic. Thus according to the "Ukrainian Plan" Republic 
of Moldova is a sovereign, independent, and territorially integral state, the single 
subject of international law. Transdniestria is granted the status of autonomous 
republic within the framework of the current Constitution of the Republic of 
Moldova. Under the plan common areas would include: law, economy, defense, social 
field, customs, humanitarian, etc. Under "Ukrainian Plan" Transdniestrian region is to 
be "administrative-territorial entity in the form of a republic within the Republic of 
Moldova" entitled to its own Constitution and symbols along the state ones which is 
definitely taken from the Crimean model. Certainly, "Ukrainian Plan" contains 
provisions from other previous documents, from Primakov Memoradum of May 1997 
to the most recent Stability and Security Pact for the Republic of Moldova. Of course 
there is more or less shift in accents.  
 
However, more provisions have been taken from Primakov Memorandum. This 
specifically refers to pentagonal negotiation format (parts - Republic of Moldova, 
Transdniestria, and mediators - Russia, Ukraine, and OSCE). The innovation is that 
the latter are to sign the Plan in the presence of US and EU. Moldovan Minister of 
Reintegration has called this new formula a "floating format". The document allows 
for US and EU involvement in the Plan enforcement: a) overseeing elections to 
Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet; b) assisting the drafting of the law on special legal  
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status of Transdniestrian region; c) taking part in the Counseling Commission 
entrusted to settle down any disputes in interpreting the law on the special legal status 
of Transdniestria. Exceptions are "enforcement of international legal measures" in 
cases when one party or another breaches the plan, right reserved only to mediators - 
Russia, Ukraine and OSCE. Noteworthy, there is no mention of the type of measures 
to be applied.  
 
However the most interesting are the terms, stages, and sequence of events provided 
for in the "Ukrainian Plan". The conflict is to be settled in three stages, six months 
each:  
 
a. at the first stage the "basic principles of the Transdniestrian status within the 
RM" are to be established. In this respect, the Parliament is to adopt by July 
25, 2005 the Law on basic principles of the status of Transdniestrian region of 
the RM. Under the terms provided in the law, elections to the Transdniestrian 
Supreme Soviet are to be held in October - November 2005. These are to be 
held under "international monitoring of EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, US, 
Russia and other democratic states". These elections and international 
monitoring are intended to legitimize the Supreme Soviet that would function 
under the proposed Law on basic principles of the status of Transdniestrian 
region. "Ukrainian Plan" remains silent on how Tiraspol administration would 
act, nor does it say how to make the latter to be more cooperative. It is all-to-
clear that this first stage would be implemented only if incumbent 
Transdnistrian authorities and Russia agree to sign the "Ukrainian Plan", 
placing thus the entire settlement process under the proposed Law on the legal 
principles of the status of Transdniestrian region.  
 
b. during the second stage the competencies shall be delimitated between the 
central power and Transdniestrian authorities. This would need the adoption 
by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova of the Law on Special Legal 
Status of the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova. 
Transdnistria's Supreme Soviet would have to pass a special normative act 
accepting the "basic principles of the state". The law shall be jointly drafted. 
Newly elected Supreme Soviet would have to "designate representatives of the 
regional legislative body to the RM parliamentary commission in view of 
drafting the law" outlining the special legal status of Transdniestria. Later on, 
once the RM Parliament adopts the law delimitating the competencies, 
Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet would have to pass another normative act 
ensuring the enforcement of that law.  
 
c. in the final stage the "final settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict" is to take 
place via "ensuring the legal status of Transdniestria in the framework of the 
RM". The two parties, Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria along with 
mediators, Russia, Ukraine and OSCE and with the assistance of US and EU 
would draft the "Treaty on guaranteeing Moldova's observance of Moldova's 
law on the special status of Transnistria." Once ratified by the RM Parliament 
the Law on special legal status of Transdnistria would enter in effect, while 
Supreme Soviet would be able to adopt Transdnistria's Constitution.  
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The guarantees granted by "Ukrainian Plan" to Transdnistria are specific to Moldova, 
as the very same guarantees were provided to Gagauz-Yeri in 1994. This is yet 
another evidence to the fact that Moldovan side took part in the elaboration of the 
Plan. Under the "Ukrainian Plan" Transdnistria would be entitled to "leave RM in 
case the latter decides to join another state" and/or RM looses its status as a subject of 
international law. Another Moldovan - style guarantee is the "Treaty on guaranteeing 
Moldova's observance of Moldova's law on the special status of Transnistria", which 
is nothing but a different Stability and Security Pact for the Republic of Moldova 
launched by President Voronin one year ago. "Ukrainian Plan's" provision on 
Conciliation Committee including representatives of RM, Transdniestria, Russia, 
Ukraine, OSCE and possibly US and EU, is also a carryover from the Pact. The goal 
of the Commission would be to settle any disputes between the two parties in case of 
different interpretation of the Law on Special Status of Transdniestria. One of the 
major differences between the "Pact and Ukrainian" Plan is the fact that Romania was 
excluded, while Transdnistria included, whereas US and EU could only assist the 
drafting of the Treaty.  
 
 
3. Context and collateral events  
 
The context in which "Ukrainian Plan" was drafted and made public needs a closer 
examination. Firstly, this is the first document coming after the European Court on 
Human Rights' judgement on "Ilascu case" clearly indicated that from a military, 
political, and economic point of view Transdniestrian region had been accountable to 
Russian Federation. Albeit the latter disapproved of the ECHR's judgment, it still 
complied. Having said that, for more than a year now there have been premises for a 
new approach to resolving Transdniestrian conflict. Indeed, "Ukrainian Plan" ensues 
from this new context, however Moldova refrains from making the necessary 
adjustments, giving thus Russia a chance to save face and withdraw honorably from 
the region.  
 
Secondly, the new context has been shaped by the regional tendencies, i.e. NATO and 
EU enlargement, the way Russian Federation protects its interests in the region. 
Recent revitalization of GUUAM and revision of its goal brought about the 
"Ukrainian Plan". Accordingly, US support to GUUAM is extremely important.  
 
Thirdly, tensions arisen between Transdnistria's Supreme Soviet majority and Igor 
Smirnov's administration on the Constitution modification in view of reducing the 
latter's powers bear both risks and benefits for the Plan. On the one hand those 
tensions show the vulnerability of the regime functioning like a "fortress under siege" 
that ought to hold on regardless the price, including the price of maintaining an 
authoritarian regime headed by Smirnov clan (Maracutsa, Antiufeev, Litskai etc) that 
generated the conflict in the first place, then lead the regime and now is interested to 
perpetrate the status quo, of which they are the only ones to befit both politically and 
economically. Those tensions also highlight the lack of democracy in Transdniestria, 
an extremely important factor in the new context of GUUAM declared goals. The 
"Ukrainian Plan" may serve as a good argument for Smirnov clan in "convincing via 
specific methods" the "reformatory deputies" from Transdniestria to give up on 
amending Constitution so as to resist the "foreign danger".  
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4. Estimations and possible evolutions  
 
The release of the "Ukrainian Plan" may be seen as a positive event, even if the 
chances of its enforcement are very slim. At least there is a document that may be 
submitted to mediators, other interested parties, as well as US and EU, Romania. 
Except for Russia and Transdnistria, the other parties have no apparent reason to 
reject it, however they may want to come up with questions and ask for specifications. 
That is exactly what Chisinau wants.  
 
The mere fact that Russia and Transdnistria voiced criticism and lingering concerns 
with regard to "Ukrainian Plan" did not take Moldovan authorities by surprise. 
Anyhow the first stage of the plan totally relies on Moldovan side that should adopt 
the would-be Law on the Basic Principles of the Status of Transdnistrian Region 
of RM by July 25, 2005. The adoption of such a law is probably intended to channel 
any initiative coming from foreign partners into the legal framework of the RM, 
whose sovereignty they respect. There is nothing more RM could do, everything now 
is up to the foreign powers. And here the benefits end, so let us consider the pitfalls of 
the "Ukrainian Plan".  
 
Firstly, "Ukrainian Plan" does not provide for any measures "to convince" the 
Transdnistrian side, in case it chooses to ignore the plan. It is all-to-clear that Tiraspol 
regime has survived only due to Russia's and Ukraine's support. Still it would be 
possible to develop and apply mechanisms that would steer the region away from a 
humanitarian crisis and at the same time would determine Tiraspol to be more 
receptive to propositions on resolving Transdnistrian conflict. A starting point would 
be securing the RM - Ukraine border by establishing joint customs control units. By 
accepting such measures Ukraine would send a clear message as to its interest to settle 
Transdnistrian conflict. The failure to enforce such measures leaves room for 
speculations about an alleged competition between different "groups" in Kiev 
administration, namely Supreme Security Council Secretary Piotr Poroshenko and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Tarasyuk. If indeed such a competition exists then 
"Ukrainian Plan" is nothing but a compromise between those "groups". And this 
because the Plan is not feasible in the given time without the aforesaid measures. 
Further, once the deadlines established for three phases expire Ukraine would most 
probably loose its interest. Under those circumstances, the primary goal for 
Transdnistria would be to survive up till the deadline, while later upcoming elections 
in Ukraine would open them new opportunities.  
 
Secondly, the fears of opposition and many pundits that enforcement of the 
"Ukrainian Plan" would end with legitimizing Transdnistrian Supreme Soviet are 
quite real. Their argument is that by recommending monitored elections to the 
Supreme Soviet, "Ukrainian Plan" does not take into account Smirnov administration, 
a clan interested in perpetrating the secessionist regime, preserve the military, 
including Russian troops. The Plan does not take into account the structures that really 
"guarantee" the existence of the secessionist regime. "Ukrainian Plan" provides 
guarantees to Transdnistria, but none to Moldova in case Tiraspol ceases cooperating 
immediately after elections to the Supreme Soviet that would legitimize it as a 
representative body of the "Transdnistrian people". Technically speaking this could be 
achieved quite "convincingly". For instance Transdnistrian Supreme Soviet might 
adopt a "normative act" as provided by the Plan, thereby it would consent to  
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cooperation with Chisinau within the framework of the would-be Law on Basic 
Principles of the Status of Transdnistrian Region of the RM, and would allow for 
international monitoring over elections to Supreme Soviet in order to legitimize 
election results. However, Smirnov may want to make a well-calculated pause and 
then strike. Under the Constitution Smirnov might appeal to Constitutional Court of 
Transdnistria that would rule that "Ukrainian Plan" runs counter to Constitution. 
Therefore, supposedly not only the Supreme Soviet but the entire regime might get a 
legitimacy following the formula - who has coercive power to enforce judiciary 
rulings that one is legitimate. Who would stop the Supreme Soviet from 
acknowledging their own mistake?  
 
Both Transdnistria and Russia would be quite tempted to halt Tiraspol's cooperation 
with Chisinau after elections to Supreme Soviet are recognized legitimate. The thing 
is that Russian troops would have to be withdrawn once the conflict is settled. There 
are a number of evidences to the fact that Russia does not want to withdraw its 
military from the region, the most eloquent of them - its stance towards obligations 
assumed at Istanbul OSCE Summit. Half-measures that would only legitimize 
Supreme Soviet leading to end of cooperation with Chisinau would result in fruitless 
discussions on the synchronizing withdrawal with final resolution of the conflict. 
Meanwhile, the effects of "economic sanctions" imposed by Russia on Moldova, 
coupled with a price hike on energy would serve as quite efficient levers in the hands 
of Russia when dealing with their Moldovan counterparts. One may conclude that 
democratization of the Transdnistrian regime via internationally monitored elections, 
without some demilitarization measures and without creating conditions for the 
departure of the groups responsible for instigating and benefiting from the conflict (as 
identified in the ECHR judgment), that is decriminalization, bears considerable risks. 
In fact "Ukrainian Plan" should be improved considering the provisions of the 
"Declaration on political partnership in view of accession to EU", unanimously voted 
by the Moldovan legislators. The document clearly indicates that Transdnistrian 
conflict should be settled in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and 
international law in close cooperation with OSCE, EU, Romania, Russia, US, and 
Ukraine and according the to the "3D" formula - democratization, demilitarization and 
decriminalization of the Transdniestrian region.  
 
Out of all these "2D" and Romania felt out. This is quite sad as after Russia imposed 
economic sanctions on Moldova, Romania has proved to be one of the most useful 
partners. Nevertheless, "Ukrainian Plan" fails to confer any role whatsoever to 
Romania in the negotiation process. Moreover, apparently Moldovan authorities are 
interested in diminishing Romania's role even further. This has produced some 
curiosities in the "Ukrainian Plan", such as "the right of Transdnistrian inhabitants(!) 
to self-determination" in case Republic of Moldova looses its sovereignty and 
independence. Albeit situation has changed, Romania being now a member of NATO 
and is about to join EU, the same wording was used as in 1994 in the case of Gagauz 
Autonomy (Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauz-Yeri), which at that time 
provided guarantees that Moldova would not join Romania.  
 
Several things are to be mentioned. Why it didn't cross the mind of Plan authors that 
the rights they came up with might be claimed by other communities as well. For 
instance, how would they like this: "the right of Donbas inhabitants to self-
determination" in case they deem Ukrainian central government promotes pro-EU,  
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pro-NATO, and anti-Russian policies? Secondly, asymmetric treatment of the 
interested parties should be taken into account. On the one hand, Russia recognizing 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the RM but de facto controls 
politically, economically and military 15% of the RM territory; on the top of that 
adopts laws that would allow other territories (controlled by separatist regimes 
supported by it) to join Russian Federation, finally it has the status of mediator and 
guarantor. On the other hand, Romania having a frozen conflict at its borders is totally 
ignored in the conflict resolution. In this respect, curiously, census data revealing 
ethnic composition of the RM were made public right before the "Ukrainian Plan", 
despite international experts' advice not to do so. Supposedly, the low figure of 
Moldovan citizens who identified themselves as Romanians, only 2.1% determined 
the authors of "Ukrainian Plan" to ignore Romania. If so then things should be made 
clear: either the number of Romanians in Moldova is so low that the fears that 
Moldova would join Romania and therefore granted the "right of the Transdnistrian 
inhabitants to self-determination" are groundless; or the "right of the Transdnistrian 
inhabitants to self-determination" is justifiable and the census data are rigged. In 
both cases things are quite sad. Statistics data are not reliable given that they 
considerably differ from the number of votes in favor of parties, dubbed by official 
propaganda as pro-Romanian. If they were indeed reliable, then things are even more 
gloomier. In that case one would say that Moldovan citizens, tens and hundreds of 
thousands of them who applied for Romanian citizenship are cynics as they did so for 
obscure interests. Anyway the credibility of Moldovan authorities and the way 
citizens view them would have a crucial impact on the model of settling 
Transdnistrian conflict, its collateral effects, European integration, as well as visa 
regime negotiations with Romania.  
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What is the future of the Ukrainian plan on resolving Transdnistrian conflict? 
Igor Botan, June 9, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 52, May 23 - June 5, 2005 
 
 
1. Reactions from the civil society  
 
As a follow-up to the provision of the "Ukrainian plan" on the need to secure the 
support of the Moldovan civil society to the plan, Association for Foreign Policy 
(AFP) founded by former high-rank officials (including Prime-Minister, Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chair of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign 
Policy, Presidential Councilor), former diplomats and pundits in foreign policy have 
recently issued a statement on the strong and weak sides of the Plan.  
 
Among the strong points of the Plan, the document cites: a) growing Ukraine's interest 
to resolve Transdnistrian conflict, especially given the levers it holds to influence the 
secessionist regime; b) abandoning federative formula and acceptance to resolve the 
conflict in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova by creating a single 
rather than joint legal, economic, social, defense, and customs areas; c) emphasis on 
democratization of the Transdnistrian region in solving the conflict; d) involving US 
and EU as observers at certain stages of the conflict resolution.  
 
On the other hand, the Association found out a string of ambiguities and 
contradictions that might seriously undermine the security, stability and sustainability 
of the reintegrated state, let alone pursuing its strategic goal - accession to EU. 
Among the flaws, AFP cited: a) no reference to demilitarization of the Transdnestrian 
region, as well as to securing Transdnistrian frontier in view of fighting illegal 
trafficking and smuggling; b) preserving the same guarantor countries - Russia and 
Ukraine - the same "peacekeeping" arrangement; c) proposition to hold "early free 
elections" to the "Transdnistrian Supreme Soviet" that would only legalize regime's 
institutions without leading to demilitarization and decriminalization of the region; d) 
hypothetical granting of the "residents' right to self-determination", all of which raise 
many eyebrows, etc.  
 
In general AFP endorsed the "Ukrainian plan", however given the numerous aforesaid 
flaws it recommended Republic of Moldova to ask for the international community's 
assistance in determining Transdnistrian administration to take steps that would show 
"minimal political will" to democratize the region: complying with European Court 
for Human Rights' judgment and releasing political prisoners; eliminating all the 
obstacles hindering the withdrawal of Russian army and munitions; canceling all 
restrictions on the free circulation of goods and people to and from Transdnistria; free 
access of international missions to munitions warehouses.  
 
Noteworthy, there is a certain degree of convergence between the AFP proposals and 
the actions already undertaken or to be undertaken by the authorities. This apparent 
convergence may only mean that certain measures have been left out on purpose so as 
to avoid its rejection right from the beginning by domestic and international 
stakeholders.  
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2. Reactions from parliamentary factions  
 
Despite the aforesaid flaws, "Ukrainian plan" has been accepted in principle by the 
leaders of the parliamentary factions as a document that might lead to the resolution 
of the Transdnistrian conflict. And this largely due to the fact that "Ukrainian plan" 
provides for the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict by granting a special legal 
status to the localities to the left of Dniester that would fall within the Constitution of 
the Republic of Moldova. At least this might be inferred from politicians' statements, 
more so their reactions voiced after the meeting with President Voronin on June 6. At 
the meeting it was decided to convene a special session of the Parliament on June 10 
to consider the provisions of the "Ukrainian plan" and adopt a Declaration regarding 
Parliament's position on the document. Practically all the leaders of parliamentary 
factions agreed that the Plan should be accepted as it is, the role of Moldovan 
authorities and political elite being to avoid the pitfalls and bring it in line with the 
European practices of conflict resolution. Noteworthy, if the said Declaration really 
stands a chance to be adopted than it is now, first time since the outbreak of the 
conflict in 1992.  
 
 
3. Diplomatic efforts  
 
The debates in Parliament and the would-be adoption by the legislators of a 
Declaration are aimed at reaching a wide consensus on resolving the conflict. At the 
same time, diplomatic efforts to secure international support to the "Ukrainian plan" 
gains grounds, which is of great importance for reaching a consensus domestically. 
Apparently, diplomatic activity is aimed at polishing the Plan's shortcomings that 
were pointed by the civil society and Moldovan opposition. Democratization of the 
region is clearly provided for in the "Ukrainian plan", while demilitarization and 
decriminalization are not. The latter are viewed by opposition as paramount. It is 
expected to achieve them with the help of the interested countries, European and Euro 
Atlantic institutions by resorting to Russia's obligation to withdraw its military from 
the region, European Court for Human Rights' judgment on "Ilascu case", securing the 
borders are cited.  
 
President Voronin's trip to Brussels on June 7 - 8 right on the eve of the special 
hearing in Parliament on the "Ukrainian plan", his talks with the NATO Secretary 
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy fall within this logic. Noteworthy, both dignitaries played a major 
role in convincing President Voronin not to sign "Kozak Memorandum" more than 
one year ago. Last year both of them publicly supported the Declaration on the 
Stability and Security for the Republic of Moldova during the OSCE summit, which 
Russia rejected. Accordingly expectations that the two would endorse and correct the 
"Ukrainian plan" are justifiable.  
 
Such diplomatic efforts would certainly have a positive impact on the Parliament 
reaching a consensus formula on the "Ukrainian plan". The more so as on June 7 
President Voronin addressing North Atlantic Council made a couple of extremely 
important statements, namely: a) developing an Individual Action Plan Moldova - 
NATO that would be implemented in parallel with the EU - Moldova Action Plan; b) 
complete demilitarization of the Transdnistrian region, having civil peacekeepers with  
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the participation of US, OSCE, EU, and Ukraine; c) developing relations with NATO 
exceeding simple training exercises. "Real problems we are facing - terrorism, 
aggressive and intransigent secessionism, organized crime, trafficking in human 
beings, corruption, smuggling - pose a threat to the democratic essence of our country 
and therefore could only be solved together"; d) "immediate, unconditional and 
complete withdrawal of Russian Federation's military forces from the soil of the 
Republic of Moldova would speed up the settlement of the conflict"; e) replacing the 
current inefficient pentagonal peacekeeping format that would "lead to a sustainable 
settlement of the conflict. Procrastination of the conflict settlement shields the efforts 
to strengthen the secessionist regime and promote foreign geopolitical and mafia 
interests that are far from those of the people residing on both banks of Dniester 
river". Enlarging the negotiation format to include EU, OSCE, US, Russia, Ukraine 
and Romania; f) joint Moldovan - Ukrainian border and customs control on the 
Transdnistrian segment of the border; g) NATO and EU cooperation with Russia in 
settling Transdnistrian conflict, raising the issue of "human rights in Transdnistrian 
region, demanding immediate release of the two political detainees of the Ilascu group 
in conformity with the ECHR' judgment of July 8, 2004".  
 
Having said that, there are premises for the acceptance both domestically and abroad 
of the "Ukrainian plan" as a basic document for settling Transdnistrian conflict. In this 
respect, some of the opposition media calls President to "strike while the iron is hot". 
And this for several reasons, firstly Ukraine needs Moldova's support in joining WTO, 
secondly international institutions want to get rid of a conflict at the EU and NATO 
borders. Under those circumstances, Russia has no other choice but to say that it 
endorses the document, agree to the enlargement of the negotiation format, only if 
both Moldova and Transdnistria agree to that. It is worth mentioning that those 
"supportive" statements come from Russia at the time they are closing their market to 
Moldovan goods and threaten to double the price on natural gas.  
 
 
4. Reactions of the Transdnistrian authorities  
 
After the first negative comments upon the release of "Ukrainian plan", Transdnistrian 
authorities have probably decided to ignore the said document. At least official media 
refrained for a period from any debates or comments. Only after the Two Presidents 
Voronin and Yushenko met on June 2 in Odessa the Transdniestrian media had to 
react. At that meeting two important things were decided: a) a joint address of the 
Two Presidents to the EU Secretary General and Chairman of the European 
Commission asking for international monitoring and control of the Transdnistrian 
portion of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border; b) creating joint Moldovan-Ukrainian 
customs units. The feedback in the Transdmentrian media came within the framework 
of the closed door meeting Ukrainian Secretary of the Security and Defense Council 
Piotr Poroshenko had with the separatist leader Igor Smirnov at the request of Viktor 
Yushenko. According to the official Transdniestrian press agency "Olvia-press" 
allegedly Poroshenko assured Transdnistrian authorities that the cornerstone of the 
"Ukrainian plan" was to "mutually reaching a compromise between the two parties 
involved in the conflict - Moldova and Transdniestria".  
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In their turn, Transdnistrian leaders declared they accepted only the "seven steps" to 
conflict resolution outlined by President Yushenko during the GUUAM Summit in 
Chisinau on April 22, especially the proposition on international monitoring of the 
elections to Transdnistrian Supreme Soviet as it would pave the way to legitimizing 
the regime. In fact, the latter is the only interest of the Tiraspol regime, especially as 
elections would be held pursuant to Transdnistrian legislation, fact allegedly 
confirmed by Poroshenko himself.  
 
The conciliate reactions of Transdnistrian media to "Ukrainian plan" stem from the 
presuppositions that Transdnistrian authorities might follow Moldovan authorities' 
example in the case of the "Kozak Memorandum" that was initially "initialed" and 
then rejected. That is, Transdnistrian authorities might follow the Plan until Supreme 
Soviet elections get legitimize, afterwards they might call for "mutually reaching a 
compromise between the two parties involved in the conflict" as provided by the 1997 
Primakov Memorandum. Russia endorses such as scenario and allegedly Poroshenko 
also does.  
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Why were new elections necessary? 
Igor Botan, 27 June 2005  
 
 
The Democratic Moldova Bloc (BMD) headed by Chisinau mayor Serafim Urechean 
garnered 28.53 percent of votes in the March 6 parliamentary elections, and got 34 out 
of 101 mandates in the new legislature. Under Article 70 of the Moldovan 
Constitution, "the quality of lawmaker is incompatible with any other post, except for 
didactic and scientific activity". Serafim Urechean decided to step down from the post 
of Chisinau mayor and to be lawmaker in the Moldovan Parliament on April 18, 2005, 
the last day of the one-month deadline after validation of mandate, when he was 
supposed to make a choice between the two offices.  
 
Under provisions of Article 109 of Constitution and its interpretations by the 
Constitutional Court, the mayor must be elected at a new scrutiny. Thus, the elections 
for the Chisinau mayor became unavoidable. It's worth mentioning that neither the 
Election Code, nor the law on local public administration provide for the exact term 
for new elections. The first normative document says only that the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) establishes the date of new elections at least 60 days before 
election day." The second document envisages only the office of interim mayor since 
the mayoral post becomes vacant and till election of a new mayor. Thus, though new 
elections are mandatory, the legislation offers enough flexibility to the CEC for a 
concomitant organisation of elections in several localities where offices of mayors 
and councillors are vacant. Although the political opportunity factor must be 
excluded, the logic behind establishing the date of new elections is based on 
optimization of administrative efforts, expenditures, adequate coverage of campaigns 
in mass media. Thus, new local elections will take place in 14 localities of Moldova 
on July 10, though the mayoral posts became vacant in different periods. Of course, 
the public opinion focuses on capital of the country, but the results of elections in 
other localities will be suggestive for interpretations.  
 
Going back to Serafim Urechean's decision to step down from the Chisinau mayor 
post, we must highlight that it was backed and criticized among his supporters. 
President Vladimir Voronin brought clarity to this disagreement situation during a 
visit to the Chisinau City Hall, shortly after Urechean had tendered resignation, saying 
that the "cold war" between central authorities and city hall was over.  
 
It doesn't matter now that the war was "cold", but some questions must be answered 
after the end of the "war": who started it and with what purpose, who won and who 
lost, etc.? It is known that the "cold war", which had propaganda, legislative, 
administrative, political, etc. dimensions, started in early 2002, when the central 
authorities tried to revise local public administration system. This action perfectly 
complied then with logic of adjustment and inclusion of local public administration in 
the structure of the "state vertical power", whose building was proclaimed as a 
strategic objective. However, the early election of local councils scheduled for April 7, 
2002, which should result with election of mayors by councils, were annulled. The 
March 14, 2003 decision # 13 of the Constitutional Court declared as unconstitutional 
the provisions of 13 articles from the December 28, 2001 Law on Local Public 
Administration, and 14 articles of the Election Code amended on January 25, 2002.  
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The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe also turned 
down the envisaged amendments.  
 
The actions mentioned above represented only the prelude of the "cold war". The 
cause of this war was indicated later - "the struggle against corruption" in the 
Chisinau City Hall. It is interesting to underline that nobody doubted over existence of 
corruption in city hall. By contrary, the absolute majority of those who discussed this 
issue were sure of corruption there. The true concern was to demonstrate the existence 
of corruption to courts, as well as to provide evidence that this scourge persists in the 
central public administration, too. Why the "cold war" started only against the 
Chisinau City Hall, namely against the Chisinau mayor-general, was the question. The 
answer was also well-known - Chisinau is the key economic centre of Moldova, 
where the most profitable affairs take place, which has the most important 
contribution to GDP, raises largest collections to the budget, the highest financial 
inflows are registered here, etc., while its authorities did not want to be included in the 
"state power vertical".  
 
These factors helped Chisinau mayor Serafim Urechean to become one of key leaders 
of opposition after the start of the "cold war", though he publicly assured immediately 
after the absolute victory of the Party of Moldovan Communists (PCRM) at the 2001 
parliamentary elections that he is ready "to cooperate with the new government". "For 
the sake of Chisinau residents," of course. On one hand, the authorities insisted that 
Urechean's involvement in political life is a manoeuvre aimed to overturn the meaning 
of corruption-related cases inside the city hall, and to turn them into ordinary 
persecutions from political reasons. On the other hand, supporters regarded Urechean 
as a "sleepy lion" which woke up to join the Moldovan "big politics" after being 
provoked, knowing how to set accounts with those who spoiled his "nice dream" to 
"cooperate with the power."  
 
Urechean met the expectations at municipal level, defeating the PCRM candidate to 
the Chisinau mayor post, Vasile Zgardan, at the May 25, 2003 elections. Urechean's 
victory was special, particularly because his main rival benefited of all the imaginable 
and impossible administrative resources. For that reason the same enthusiastic 
supporters of Urechean identified the Chisinau City Hall with "the last bastion of 
democracy" in Moldova. The victory was also decisive for appointment of Serafim 
Urechean as leader of a key opposition party - the Democratic Moldova Bloc. 
However, Urechean's BMD failed in the 2005 parliamentary elections after the victory 
in 2003. Therefore, it was very risky for Urechean to keep running the post of mayor, 
with such a decision meaning the continuation of the "cold war", obstruction of his 
normal activity, and incapacity to implement his project "Sociopolis" that he promised 
to Chisinau residents at the May 25, 2003 elections. In this regard, the "besieged 
fortress" strategy of PCRM against Chisinau was effective. Those who were down-
hearted and tired of political, administrative, financial-budgetary manoeuvres of the 
Chisinau Municipal Council, government, etc., components of the "cold war", left the 
"last bastion" of democracy without any "battles".  
 
A very bad situation followed the "cold war". The Chisinau residents were the main 
losers of the "cold war". They still face the range of unsolved old problems, which the 
"cold war" had even worsened. The worst is that Chisinau residents do not know at 
least whether the "cold war" was grounded, since the justice proved nothing after the  
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three-year "war". Thus, if Urechean is not corrupt, the "cold war" started by central 
authorities is an example of sounding abuse, with negative effect for the capital and 
its residents, especially for democratic processes in Moldova. If he is corrupt and the 
authorities could not prove his guilt for more than three years, with all their declared 
interest and arsenal, then Urechean is a very talented person who stands out on 
background of some authorities incapable to combat the corruption scourge through 
legal methods, though they just signed and adopted strategic documents such as the 
Moldova-European Union Action Plan, Strategy on prevention and struggle against 
corruption, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which call 
among others for democratisation of Moldova, anti-corruption fight, etc. In this 
regard, the metaphor of the chief of state regarding the "cold war" was very accurate 
and funny, but harmful for his party. It insistently raises the following question: will 
the authorities be capable to implement and fulfil the tasks outlined by these strategic 
documents? This question is not smutty, but it is serious for the future "national 
consensus".  
 
Under these circumstances, the turnout of the new elections for the Chisinau mayor, 
regardless validated or not, will have a significant impact, including on further 
development of the party system in Moldova, which is crossing a critical phase. Thus, 
two parties of the so-called "constructive opposition" face internal conflicts, which 
affect their image and rating. The ruling party is also undertaking a declared 
modernisation process, and it is expected to review its basic documents, and 
eventually to change its name. This process is rather latent and it is part of promotion 
of internal and foreign policies by PCRM leader, which may generate internal 
tensions and would be probably fuelled from outside, though they serve as ground for 
the so-called "national consensus". Resignation of the leader of the so-called "active 
opposition, Serafim Urechean, who contests the actions of government and 
"constructive opposition", from the post of Chisinau mayor, and challenging of early 
elections create conditions for manifestation of perceptions of voters over the 
immediate effects of the "national consensus" and variances he had provoked between 
parties who supported him. It's worth mentioning that the "cold war" justifies his 
resignation from city hall and absolves Urechean of responsibility for his promise to 
implement the mega-project "Sociopolis", which called for another number of smaller 
projects such as "Buy Goods Made in Chisinau", "Your Apartment", "Protected 
Elderly", "Education", "Healthcare", "Anti-Poverty Struggle", "Clean Water", "Youth 
of Chisinau", "Chisinau - Centre of International Tourism", "Chisinau - Regional 
Commercial Centre", "Chisinau - Producer of Ecologically Clean Goods". The 
probability that Urechean could maintain the mayoral office at the 2007 general local 
elections was significantly declining given the ongoing "cold war". For this reason, it 
was logical to resign from the mayor post, which was reducing his perspectives, and 
to choose the office of lawmaker that opens new opportunities in national politics. His 
capacity to use the new opportunities is a problem of future, including of the Alliance 
Our Moldova, which elected Urechean as chairman at its June 25 congress of the 
party.  
 
The effects of postponement of decision to resign from the mayoral post with one 
month and half after the March 6 parliamentary elections may be of a special 
importance so far. This delay "pushed" the new elections to the mid-summer, during 
vacations and holidays. Voter participation in the three general local elections held in 
Chisinau in April-May was around 45 percent. Thus, this percentage could decline in  
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the upcoming mid-summer elections. These forecasts are based on the fact that the 
problem of students' vote is not an issue anymore because of summer holidays. 
Previous local and parliamentary elections in 2003 and 2005 proved that students 
represent about 10 percent of the total number of voters in Chisinau. As a rule, many 
young and medium-aged families with moderate income leave the cities for summer 
holidays, especially for the sake of their children's health. It is hard to estimate their 
proportion but it wouldn't be exaggerate to forecast a voter turnout lower below 1/3, 
needed to validate elections. Also, the structure of electorate could be somehow 
distorting, if categories of citizens with a reduced "mobility" such as elderly, veterans, 
citizens with low and very low income would mainly cast their ballots on July 10. 
These categories of citizens need social assistance and that's why they are more 
motivated to vote, increasing the chances of parties viewed as targeting social 
protection.  
 
Thus, the chances of candidates must be estimated both based on the party ratings and 
their evolutions after the "national consensus", and voter turnout and categories of 
voters casting their ballots. We saw that the latter may depend a lot on the time period 
elections are held, as well as on the dose of confusion generated by perception of the 
need of these elections provoked by the "end of the cold war", justification of this 
war, eventual effects, etc.  
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The eve of mayor elections 
Igor Volnitchi, 30 June 2005  
 
 
 
1. Would the July 10 elections be valid? 
 
Currently the top question related to mayor elections is would they get the voter 
turnout required for validation. Under the law, elections are considered valid provided 
at least 1/3 of the total number of voters take part in elections. Statistics shows that 
the number of voters included in the voter rolls has been on the rise in the recent 
years. For instance, in the 2003 local elections 564 thousand voters were included in 
the voter rolls, while in the 2005 parliamentary elections 618 thousand. Parliamentary 
elections were held not so long ago, accordingly no major changes in the number of 
voters is to be expected. Consequently, for elections to be validated 206 thousand 
voters have to take part.  
 
There are several grounds for fears of invalid elections. Firstly, political pundits and 
political leaders believe that the timing of elections is not right as many are in 
vacations and would not take part in elections. They claim the power forced CEC to 
set elections date for July 10 so as to diminish oppositions' chances in elections. It is 
known for a fact that Communist party electorate is represented mainly by elderly and 
Russian speakers. The former does not take vacations at all. As for the latter, they are 
very disciplined when it comes to elections and might postpone their vacation for 
later. Things are totally opposite when it comes to oppositions' electorate - not only do 
they lack discipline as compared to Communist electorate, they also lack civic 
consciousness. Practically, every second democratic voter would rather take a 
vacation than postpone it for political reasons.  
 
Still it would be naive to consider that election date was set on July 10, only because 
it suited the governing party. In fact, the power didn't even had the levers to influence 
that decision, as CEC had to follow on Municipal Council's initiative to host elections 
in the capital. Under the law, following that initiative CEC had to set election date for 
the end of June, or early July. So it is a mere coincidence that the date set by the CEC 
is in the best interest of the ruling party, rather than an intricately contrived scenario. 
On top of that, low voter turnout and non-validation of the elections would hit hard 
democrats and Communists alike. Accordingly, the ruling party has the same interest 
as democrats do - July 10 elections to take place.  
 
Second reason for elections to be considered invalid is the fact that students are out of 
town and would not be able to take part in elections. Opposition parties already 
blamed the ruling party "which has no interest in students' participation in elections, 
as they usually vote for the democrats". There are all the reasons to believe that even 
if the students were in Chisinau on election date, the situation wouldn't be much 
different, as they are usually quite passive. For instance in the past elections, CEC 
printed 42 thousand certificates granting the students the right to vote in any locality, 
however a little over two thousand showed up to pick the certificates. Further, out of 
those who did show up not all voted. Consequently, even if the students were on July 
10 in Chisinau their presence wouldn't have had a significant impact on the voter 
turnout, nor on the votes garnered by electoral contestants.  
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Thirdly, there is a fear that many voters disappointed with the latest political 
developments would not show at the polling stations at all. This refers specifically to 
the Christian-Democrats' voters, accounting for 15% in Chisinau and those of Socio-
Liberal Party, 1.5-2% accordingly. The two parties, previously known for their anti-
Communist position, voted for Vladimir Voronin as a President and joined 
Communists on several important initiatives. Many Christian-Democrat and Social-
Liberal voters disappointed by their leaders might choose to boycott elections. This 
holds true for the Social-Democrat voters (1.5 - 2%) frustrated that their party fails to 
score a victory, no matter how hard it tries.  
 
All the aforesaid factors might result in a low turnout. At the same time, CEC is 
inclined to believe that July 10 elections would be rather validated than not. Firstly, 
they rightly point that in the previous parliamentary elections the voter turnout in 
Chisinau reached 55%. Even if the aforesaid factors would determine voters' 
passivity, they might steel at most 15-20%. If so, then another 35%-40% would still 
cast their ballots, enough for the elections to be validated.  
 
CEC counts on the villages that are also part of the Chisinau municipality. The 
number of voters residing in those villages amounts to 100 thousand, out of which 
70% regularly vote. Consequently, villages could provide one third of the so-much 
needed voters for the elections to be considered valid. The other two thirds could be 
secured by the loyal voters of the Party of Communists, "Moldova Noastra" Alliance 
and Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party.  
 
Currently no one could tell for sure whether July 10 elections would be valid or not. 
Still, a mention should be made that there are more chances for them to succeed than 
fail.  
 
 
2. Chances of the candidates running for the mayoralty 
 
What distinguishes this campaign from others is that there are no clear leaders in the 
race. Of course, Communist candidate Zinaida Grecianii and independent Dumitru 
Braghis have a certain advantage, which does not guarantee that one of them would 
be elected. One month ago no one doubted that it would be the Communist and 
Moldova Noastra candidates that would fight for the mayoralty, however the mistakes 
made by them and their parties hence have dramatically changed the situation.  
 
Many political pundits say it was a mistake for Communists to designate Zinaida 
Grecianii as she is not known in Chisinau. To put it differently she is known but only 
as a Minister not as solver of the many problems Chisinau is facing. These pundits 
claim that the ruling party should have designated a good administrator or a well-
known personality. Initially, these were the general expectations and the following 
were cited: former Prime Minister Ion Sturza, Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
European Integration Andrei Stratan, Chief of Trade and Industry Chamber Gheorghe 
Cucu, Former Energy Minister Iacob Timciuc, former Minister of Transportation and 
Communications Vasile Zgardan. Each of the aforesaid, according to pundits claims 
would have been much more suitable for the mayoralty as they are either well-known 
or have hands-on experience in solving Chisinau problems. Probably Communists 
counted that Zinaida Grecianii would first make an order in the municipality finances  
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and after finding the funds would proceed to solving municipality problems. However 
these electoral calculations are hard to understand for an ordinary voter who would 
rather see a mayor knowing a little about many fields, than a lot in one field.  
 
Furthermore, in contrast to the previous elections this time Communist candidate 
would face a tough competition on the centre-left playing ground. And this because 
another two candidates would fight for the same pro-Russian voters nostalgic for the 
old times, i.e. Valeriu Klimenko and Gheorghe Sima. The latter could count on no 
more than one percent, however the former representing "Ravnopravie" and the other 
two socialist parties ("Patria-Rodina" Bloc) may garner up to 8%. And this because 
Valeriu Klimenko might steal some tradionally-Communist voters disappointed with 
the policies promoted by the ruling party in the last year.  
 
Zinaida Grecianii might easily concede the battle to Democratic Party's Vladimir 
Guritenco. He might be voted by some moderate Communist supporters that enjoy the 
friendship between the Democratic party and Social-Liberals and Christian-
Democrats. Secondly, Vladimir Guritenco might lure many voters of the Botanica 
district where he is a praetor and enjoys a positive image. Thus far, Botanica district 
has been considered Communists' bastion.  
 
The aforesaid factors might rob Zinaida Grecianii of many votes, experts forecast that 
she would garner less than 40% in the first round. There is no doubt, however, that 
she would get to the second round, when the big battle for the Mayoralty will be 
fought.  
 
Albeit one of the favourites, still Dumitru Braghis might garner less votes that 
"Moldova Noastra" Alliance in 2003 elections. Former Prime-Minister refused to run 
on the party list and chose to run as an independent candidate. By doing so, pundits 
claim, he wanted to secure the support of Social-Democratic Party, Centrist Party, etc. 
However the move would cost him dear. Running as independent he might count on 
the 2% of Social-Democrat voters and 0.5% of the Centrist Union. On the contrary, 
by rejecting Moldova Noastra's offer he risks to lose the electorate of the former 
Independents' Alliance (traditionally voting for Urechean) and that of the former 
Liberal Party (led by Veaceslav Untila). All in all, they account for 15% of the 
Chisinau voters.  
 
In addition, independent candidate Dumitru Braghis confirmed the rumours of 
scission within Moldova Noastra Alliance. This might also scare voters away, they 
might have voted for the leader of a party setting itself as the main opposition party, 
but would think twice before voting a "rebel leader" representing himself and a small 
group of followers. This complicates the task for the former Prime-Minister, still he 
stands real chances of getting to the second round and this only because other 
candidates are even weaker.  
 
It is said that Christian-Democratic candidate might also end with less votes than 
usual. Thus far, Christian-Democrat candidates garnered between 10-15%, this time 
Gheorghe Susarenco's rating is said to be as low as 5-6%. And this because he is not a 
party member nor does he have enough experience with the Christian-Democrats that 
might have attracted the party's traditional electorate. Not less important the party has 
tarnished its image after voting for Communists.  
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It might well happen that some of the Christian-Democrat and Moldova Noastra 
voters would shift to independent Mihai Severovan. He might also win the support of 
liberal voters as he used to be a member of the party headed by Mircea Snegur and 
later by Veaceslav Untila; and of the/ Christian-Democrat voters being the closest to 
their ideals.  
 
As for the rest of candidates they stand little chances of success according to many 
political analysts.  
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